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ARTICLE
Genomic epidemiology reveals transmission
patterns and dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in Aotearoa
New Zealand
Jemma L. Geoghegan 1,2✉, Xiaoyun Ren2, Matthew Storey2, James Hadfield3, Lauren Jelley2, Sarah Jefferies2,
Jill Sherwood2, Shevaun Paine2, Sue Huang 2, Jordan Douglas4, Fábio K. Mendes4, Andrew Sporle 5,6,
Michael G. Baker7, David R. Murdoch 8, Nigel French 9, Colin R. Simpson 10,11, David Welch4,
Alexei J. Drummond 4, Edward C. Holmes 12, Sebastián Duchêne13 & Joep de Ligt 2
New Zealand, a geographically remote Pacific island with easily sealable borders, imple-
mented a nationwide ‘lockdown’ of all non-essential services to curb the spread of COVID-19.
Here, we generate 649 SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences from infected patients in New
Zealand with samples collected during the ‘first wave’, representing 56% of all confirmed
cases in this time period. Despite its remoteness, the viruses imported into New Zealand
represented nearly all of the genomic diversity sequenced from the global virus population.
These data helped to quantify the effectiveness of public health interventions. For example,
the effective reproductive number, Re of New Zealand’s largest cluster decreased from 7 to
0.2 within the first week of lockdown. Similarly, only 19% of virus introductions into New
Zealand resulted in ongoing transmission of more than one additional case. Overall, these
results demonstrate the utility of genomic pathogen surveillance to inform public health and
disease mitigation.
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New Zealand is one of a handful of countries that aimed toeliminate coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19). The dis-ease was declared a global pandemic by the World Health
Organisation (WHO) on 11 March 2020. The causative virus,
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)1,
was first identified and reported in China in late December 2019,
and is the seventh coronavirus known to infect humans, likely
arising through zoonotic transmission from wildlife2. Because of
its relatively high case fatality rate3–5, and virus transmission
from asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic individuals6,7, SARS-
CoV-2 presents a significant public health challenge. Due to its
high rate of transmission, morbidity and mortality, SARS-CoV-2
has resulted in world-wide lockdowns, economic collapses and
led to healthcare systems being overrun.
Since the publication of the first SARS-CoV-2 genome on 10
January 20208, there has been a substantial global effort to
contribute and share genomic data to inform local and inter-
national communities about key aspects of the pandemic and
use these data to complement traditional approaches to infec-
tious disease control9. Analyses of genomic data have played an
important role in tracking the epidemiology and evolution of
the virus, often doing so in real time10, and leading to a greater
understanding of COVID-19 outbreaks globally11–15. Ulti-
mately, these data may help reveal the impact of differing dis-
ease control strategies, from strong population lockdowns such
as that used in New Zealand, to countries like Sweden that
limited the sizes of social gatherings and implemented distance
learning for some school students, but which did not impose a
strict lockdown.
New Zealand reported its first case on 26 February 2020 and
within a month implemented a stringent, country-wide lockdown of
all non-essential services. To investigate the origins, time-scale and
duration of virus introductions into New Zealand, the extent and
pattern of viral spread across the country, and to quantify the
effectiveness of intervention measures, we generated whole-genome
sequences from 56% of all documented SARS-CoV-2 cases from
New Zealand and combined these with detailed epidemiological data.
Results and discussion
Between 26 of February and 1 July 2020, there were a total of
1178 laboratory-confirmed cases and a further 350 probable
cases of SARS-CoV-2 in New Zealand. A ‘probable case’ means
a person who has been classified as such by the medical officer
of health based on exposure history and clinical symptoms,
and who has either returned a negative laboratory result or
could not be tested. Of these combined laboratory-confirmed
and probable cases, 55% were female and 45% were male, with
the highest proportion of cases in the 20–29 age group
(Table 1). Many cases were linked to overseas travel (37%).
Geographic locations in New Zealand with the highest number
of reported cases did not necessarily reflect the human popu-
lation size or density in that region, with the highest incidence
reported in the Southern District Health Board (DHB) region
rather than in highly populated cities (Fig. 1). The number of
laboratory-confirmed cases peaked on 26 March 2020, the day
after New Zealand instigated an Alert Level 4 lockdown—the
most stringent level, ceasing all non-essential services and
stipulating that the entire population self-isolate (Fig. 1; see
ref. 16 for a summary of New Zealand’s COVID-19 alert
levels). From 23 May 2020, New Zealand experienced 25
consecutive days with no new reported cases until 16 June,
when new infections, linked to overseas travel, were diagnosed.
All subsequent new cases have been from patients in managed
quarantine facilities.
We sequenced a total of 649 virus genomes from samples
taken between 26 February (first reported case) and 22 May
2020 (the last confirmed case that was not associated with
managed quarantine facilities during the sampling time per-
iod). This represented 56% of all New Zealand’s confirmed
Table 1 Demographics of COVID-19 cases in New Zealand.
Number of cases Deceased Percentage of genomes in data set (%)
Age group
0–9 37 0 6
10–19 122 0 38
20–29 365 0 45
30–39 238 0 39
40–49 221 0 42
50–59 248 0 44
60–69 180 3 45
70–79 78 7 45
80–89 30 7 50
90+ 9 5 56
Gender Number of cases Percentage of cases (%) Percentage of genomes in data set (%)
Female 848 55 42
Male 680 45 41
Ethnicity Number of cases Percentage of cases (%) Percentage of genomes in data set (%)
European or other 1067 70 46
Asian 210 14 27
Māori 130 9 42
Pacific peoples 81 5 35
Middle Eastern/Latin American/African 33 2 42
Unknown 7 0.50 86
Transmission type Number of cases Percentage of cases (%) Percentage of genomes in data set (%)
Imported cases 572 37 48
Locally acquired cases 956 63 39
Demographic data for confirmed (n= 1178) and probable (n= 350) cases of SARS-CoV-2 in New Zealand between 26 February and 1 July 2020. The percentage of genomes sequenced in each category
is shown.
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cases. The data generated originated from the 20 DHBs from
across New Zealand. DHBs submitted between 0.1 and 81% of
their positive samples to the Institute of Environmental Science
and Research (ESR), Wellington, for sequencing. Despite this
disparity, a strong nationwide spatial representation was
achieved (Fig. 1).
Notably, the genomic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 sequences sam-
pled in New Zealand represented nearly all of the genomic diversity
present in the global viral population, with nine second-level A and
B lineages from a proposed global SARS-CoV-2 genomic nomen-
clature17 identified. This high degree of genomic diversity was
observed throughout the country (Fig. 2). The SARS-CoV-2 gen-
omes sampled in New Zealand comprised 24% aspartic acid (SD614)
and 73% glycine (SG614) at residue 614 in the spike protein (Fig. 2).
Preliminary studies suggest that the D614G mutation can enhance
viral infectivity in cell culture18 and phylodynamic approaches have
shown an increase in growth and size of lineages with this muta-
tion19. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the increase in glycine in
New Zealand samples is due to multiple importation events of this
variant rather than selection for this mutation within New Zealand.
We also inferred a weak yet significant temporal signal in the data,
reflecting the low mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2, which is consistent
with findings reported elsewhere (Fig. 2).
Despite the small size of the New Zealand outbreak, there were
277 separate introductions of the virus out of the 649 cases con-
sidered. Of these, we estimated that 24% (95% CI: 23–30) led to only
one other secondary case (i.e. singleton) while just 19% (95% CI:
15–20) of these introduced cases led to ongoing transmission,
forming a transmission lineage (i.e. onward transmission to more
than one individual; Fig. 3). The remainder (57%) did not lead to a
transmission event. New Zealand transmission lineages most often
originated in North America, rather than in Asia where the virus first
emerged, likely reflecting the high prevalence of the virus in North
America during the sampling period. By examining the time of the
most recent common ancestor, or TMRCA, of the samples, we found
no evidence that the virus was circulating in New Zealand before the
first reported case on 26 February. Finally, we found that detection
was more efficient (i.e. fewer cases were missed) later in the epidemic
in that the detection lag (the duration of time from the first inferred
transmission event to the first detected case) declined with the age of
transmission lineages (as measured by the time between the present
and the TMRCA; Fig. 3).
The largest clusters in New Zealand were often associated
with social gatherings such as weddings, hospitality and con-
ferences20. The largest cluster identified during the sampling
time, which comprised lineage B.1.26, most likely originated in
the USA according to epidemiological data, and significant
local transmission in New Zealand was probably initiated by a
super spreading event at a wedding in Southern DHB (geo-
graphically the most southern DHB) prior to lockdown.
Examining the rate of transmission of this cluster enables us to
quantify the effectiveness of the lockdown. Its effective
reproductive number, Re, decreased over time from 7 at the
beginning of the outbreak (95% credible interval, CI: 3.7–10.7)
to 0.2 (95% CI: 0.1–0.4) by the end of March (Fig. 4). The
sampling proportion of this cluster, a key parameter of the
model, had a mean of 0.75 (95% CI: 0.4–1), suggesting
sequencing captured the majority of cases in this outbreak. In
addition, analysis of genomic data has linked five additional
cases to this cluster that were not identified in the initial epi-
demiological investigation, highlighting the added value of
genomic analysis. This cluster, seeded by a single-super
spreading event that resulted in New Zealand’s largest chain
of transmission, illustrates the link between micro-scale
transmission to nationwide spread (Fig. 4).
The marked decrease in Re of this large cluster coupled with the
relatively low number of virus introductions that resulted in a
transmission lineage suggests that implementing a strict and early
lockdown in New Zealand rapidly reduced multiple chains of virus
transmission. As New Zealand continues its goal to eliminate
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Fig. 1 Number and distribution of cases and genomes. a Number of laboratory-confirmed cases by reported date, both locally acquired (grey) and linked
to overseas travel (blue) in New Zealand, highlighting the timing of public health alert levels 1–4 (‘eliminate’, ‘restrict’, ‘reduce’, ‘prepare’) and national
border closures. The number of genomes sequenced in this study is shown over time in yellow. b Map of New Zealand’s District Health Boards shaded by
the incidence of laboratory-confirmed cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 people, as defined by the colour-bar. c Number of laboratory-confirmed cases per
District Health Board (DHB) versus the number of genomes sequenced, indicating Spearman’s rho (ρ), where asterisks indicate statistical significance (p=
0.000000062).
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COVID-19 community transmission, but with positive cases still
detected amongst individuals quarantined at the border reflecting
high virus incidence in other localities, it is imperative that ongoing
genomic surveillance is an integral part of the national response to
monitor any re-emergence of the virus, particularly when border
restrictions might eventually be eased.
Methods
Ethics statement. Nasopharyngeal samples testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 by
real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) were obtained from public health
medical diagnostics laboratories located throughout New Zealand. All samples
were de-identified before receipt by the researchers. Under contract for the Min-
istry of Health, ESR has the approval to conduct genomic sequencing for sur-
veillance of notifiable diseases.
Genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2. A total of 733 laboratory-confirmed
samples of SARS-CoV-2 were received by ESR for whole-genome sequencing. Viral
extracts were prepared from respiratory tract samples where SARS-CoV-2 was
detected by RT-PCR using WHO-recommended primers and probes targeting the
E and N gene. Extracted RNA from SARS-CoV-2 positive samples were subject to
whole-genome sequencing following the ARTIC network protocol (V1 and V3)
and the New South Wales (NSW) primer set15.
Briefly, three different tiling amplicon designs were used to amplify viral cDNA
prepared with SuperScript IV. Sequence libraries were then constructed using
Illumina Nextera XT for the NSW primer set or the Oxford Nanopore ligation
sequencing kit for the ARTIC protocol. Libraries were sequenced using Illumina
NextSeq chemistry or R9.4.1 MinION flow cells, respectively. Near-complete
(>90% recovered) viral genomes were subsequently assembled through reference
mapping. Steps included in the pipeline are described in detail online (https://
github.com/ESR-NZ/NZ_SARS-CoV-2_genomics).
The reads generated with Nanopore sequencing using ARTIC primer sets (V1 and
V3) were mapped and assembled using the ARTIC bioinformatics medaka pipeline (v
1.1.0)21. For the NSW primer set, raw reads were quality and adapter trimmed using
trimmomatic (v 0.36)22. Trimmed paired reads were mapped to a reference using the
Burrows–Wheeler Alignment tool23. Primer sequences were masked using iVar (v
1.2)24. Duplicated reads were marked using Picard (v 2.10.10)25 and not used for SNP
calling or depth calculation. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) were called
using bcftools mpileup (v 1.9)26. SNPs were quality trimmed using vcflib (v 1.0.0)27
requiring 20× depth and overall quality of 30. Positions that were <20× were masked
to N in the final consensus genome. Positions with an alternative allele frequency
between 20 to 79% were also masked to N. In total, 649 sequences passed our quality
control (BioProject: PRJNA648792; a list of genomes and their sequencing methods
are provided in Supplementary Data 1). Case details were sourced from the national
notifiable diseases database, EpiSurv28.
Phylogenetic analysis of SARS-CoV-2. SARS-CoV-2 sequences from New Zeal-
and, together with 1000 genomes uniformly sampled at random from the global
population from the ~50,000 available sequences from GISAID29 (June 2020; see
Supplementary Data 1 for accession numbers), were aligned using MAFFT(v 7)30















































































Fig. 2 Genomic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 in New Zealand. a Root-to-tip regression analysis of New Zealand (blue) and global (grey) SARS-CoV-2
sequences, with the determination coefficient, r2 (an asterisk indicates statistical significance; p= 0.049). b Maximum-likelihood time-scaled phylogenetic
analysis of 649 viruses sampled from New Zealand (coloured circles) on a background of 1000 randomly subsampled viruses from the globally available
data (grey circles). Viruses sampled from New Zealand are colour-coded according to their genomic lineage16 as labelled in c. c The number of SARS-CoV-
2 genomes sampled in New Zealand within each lineage16. d The sampling location and proportion of SARS-CoV-2 genomes sampled from each viral
genomic lineage is shown on the map of New Zealand. e The frequency of D (blue) and G (red) amino acids at residue 614 on the spike protein over time.
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using the FFT-NS-2 algorithm. Ambiguous sites that have been flagged as potential
sequencing errors were masked31. A maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree was
estimated using IQ-TREE (v 1.6.8)32, utilising the Hasegawa–Kishino–Yano (HKY+
Γ)33 nucleotide substitution model with a gamma-distributed rate variation among
sites (the best fit model was determined by ModelFinder34), and branch support
assessment using the ultrafast bootstrap method35. We regressed root-to-tip genetic
divergence against sampling dates to investigate the evolutionary tempo of our SARS-
CoV-2 samples using TempEst (v 1.5.3)36. Lineages were assigned according to the
proposed nomenclature17 using pangolin (https://github.com/hCoV-2019/pangolin).
To depict virus evolution in time, we used Least Squares Dating (v 1.8)37 to estimate a
time-scaled phylogenetic tree using the day of sampling.
With the full set of New Zealand sequences, we used a time-aware coalescent
Bayesian exponential growth model available in BEAST (v 1.10.4)38. The HKY
+ Γ model of nucleotide substitution was again used along with a strict
molecular clock. Because the data did not display a strong temporal signal, we
used an informative prior reflecting recent estimates for the substitution rate of
SARS-CoV-239. The clock rate had a Γ prior distribution as a prior with a mean
of 0.8 × 10–3 subs/site/year and standard deviation of 5 × 10–4 (parameterised
using the shape and rate of the Γ distribution). Parameters were estimated using
the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) framework, with 2 × 108
steps-long chains, sampling every 1 × 105 steps and removing the initial 10% as
burn-in. Sufficient sampling was assessed using Tracer (v 1.7.1)40, by verifying
that every parameter had effective sampling sizes above 200. Virus sequences
were annotated as ‘imported’ (including country of origin) or ‘locally acquired’,
according to epidemiological data provided by EpiSurv28. From a set of 1000
posterior trees, we estimated the number of statistics using NELSI41. We
determined the number of introductions of the virus into New Zealand as well as
the changing number of local transmission lineages through time, with the latter
defined as two or more New Zealand SARS-CoV-2 cases that descend from a
shared introduction event of the virus into New Zealand42. Importation events
that led to only a single case rather than a transmission lineage are referred to as
‘singletons’. For each transmission lineage and singleton, we inferred the
TMRCA.
To estimate Re through time, we analysed New Zealand sequences from the clade
identified to be associated with a wedding. We used a Bayesian birth-death skyline
model using BEAST (v 2.5)43, estimating Re for two time-intervals, as determined by
the model, and with the same parameter settings as above. We assumed an infectious
period of 10 days, which is consistent with global epidemiological estimates44.





















































































Fig. 3 Genomic transmission lineages of SARS-CoV-2 in New Zealand. a Frequency of transmission lineage size. b The number of samples in each
transmission lineage as a function of the date at which the transmission lineage was sampled, coloured by the likely origin of each lineage (inferred from
epidemiological data). Importation events that led to only one additional case (singletons) are shown in grey over time. c Frequency of TMRCA (the time of the
most recent common ancestor) of importation events over time. d The difference between the TMRCA and the date as which a transmission lineage was


































Fig. 4 Estimates of the effective reproductive number, Re, through time.
Maximum clade credibility phylogenetic tree of New Zealand’s largest
cluster with an infection that most likely originated in the USA. Estimates of
the effective reproductive number, Re, are shown in violin plots
superimposed onto the tree, grouping the New Zealand samples into two
time-intervals as determined by the model. Black horizontal lines indicate
the mean Re. Tips are coloured by the reporting District Health Board and
their location shown on the map.
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Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Genomic data generated in this study is available under BioProject: PRJNA648792 as well
as on GISAID (a list of GISAID genome accession numbers for these data and global
genomes used here are provided in Supplementary Data 1). Demographic case data are
openly available (www.health.govt.nz). Phylogenetic tree files and code used to analyse
them are available online (https://github.com/sebastianduchene/
summarise_importations).
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